when the Army of the Rhine was weakened at a critical moment by the transfer of twenty-five thousand men into Italy in order to assure the glories of Marengo. An official journal falsely declared that his soldiers had been paid from the public coffers. Such was the state of public morality that the charge was considered injurious, as in fact it was intended to be. Moreau in reply boasted that he had received but eighteen million francs from Paris, that he had levied forty-four millions on Germany, and that of the total there was a surplus of seven millions which had been distributed among the soldiers and officers. This paper was pigeonholed in the ministry of war, and the newspapers were forbidden to print the copies sent to them. The writer's feelings may be imagined. If he and the others who were discontented had shown the craft which Bonaparte did, their opposition would have been dangerous; but they were so carefully watched that their every movement was known beforehand and thwarted. Still further, they were, by the wiles of their enemies, insensibly led to the commission of foolish deeds and the utterance of rash words, which put them within reach of the law. In this particular network of conspiracies, Fouche was not the principal, although he was a valued consultant. This system .was admirably illustrated in the fall of Moreau, who was not a wary man, and had permitted royalist agents to hold communication with him. One of these, the Abbe David, was seized, but no damaging evidence was obtained. Thereupon recourse was had

1899); Huot de Penanster: Une conspiration en Tan XI et XII; Caudrillier: LecomplotdePanXII (Revue Historique, 1901-1902); Rose: Napoleon, I, 406 (quotes the original papers in British archives); ters and Despatches; Pellew: Life of Lord Sidmouth, Earl of St. Vincent; Welschinger: Le due d'Enghien; Boulay de la Meurthe: Les demises anne*es du due d'Enghien; Sorel: LecturesHistoriques. Paget Papers; Castlereagh: Let-